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Speeches
GREEK-AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL & MEDICAL CONFERENCE
31 MAY 1999
ARE THE PROFESSIONS WORTH KEEPING?
Murray Gleeson *
Of the influences affecting life at the
end of this millenium, one which causes dismay, confusion,
and demoralization, is the powerful centripetal force of commercialism.
It has affected so many aspects of our lives and our environment,
that nothing seems to be immune, least of all professional
life.
Professional associations now encourage
their members to engage in marketing behaviour which, until
a few years ago, they condemned as unethical. It is now taken
for granted that being businesslike is a primary objective
in the conduct of a professional practice, without much discrimination
between those aspects of business conduct which are worth
taking up, and those which are not. An American law professor
has advocated a "professional paradigm shift", discarding
the "business-profession dichotomy" and accepting as a new
paradigm, in the public interest, "law practice as business"1.
In Australia, the professions are under pressure to conform
to national competition policy, and the State and Territory
governments have subscribed to a Competition Principles Agreement,
which is reinforced by financial sanctions administered by
the Commonwealth Government. The agreement involves adherence
to a competition code which applies the scheme of the Trade
Practices legislation to all anti-competitive business practices.
In that context, no business-profession dichotomy is recognized2.
For many years people within the professions
have been asking whether the professions are becoming a business.
There is an equally important question: who cares? The public
should be encouraged to think about what they expect of the
professions. Members of professions need to think about the
same thing. Practitioners of medicine and the law, who claim
to value their professional status, cannot simply wring their
hands and accept devaluation as though it were inevitable.
There could be no better occasion for
examining the issue than a gathering of people associated
with the medical and legal professions, in this place.
When Hippocrates conceived the idea that
medical practitioners should take an oath in common form,
it may be assumed that he met some opposition. Local economists
would have regarded the proposal as anti-competitive. Other
critics would have complained that the idea was elitist. Some
practitioners would have gone off to consult lawyers, seeking
advice as the precise limits of the restraints imposed on
them, and as to how those limits could be circumvented. The
organising committee of the Olympic Games would have expressed
concern at the prospective loss of sponsorships from manufacturers
of pessaries.
The terms of the oath provide a useful
summary of the elements of a profession. First, there is a
recognition of the importance of formal instruction in an
art or science, an acknowledgment of indebtedness to teachers,
and an acceptance of an obligation to impart knowledge to
others. Next, there is an undertaking to pursue the welfare
of patients. There is a promise to behave in a manner that
will not bring the calling into disrepute. There is an undertaking
to respect professional confidence. Above all, there is a
commitment to the idea of conduct governed by a sense of duty
to help others. Hippocrates evidently did not subscribe to
the theory that the best way to promote effective health care
delivery in Kos was to encourage medical practitioners to
pursue their own enlightened self-interest in competition
with one another. Perhaps he had less confidence in doctors
than Adam Smith had in bakers. Or perhaps he thought it was
in the public interest that doctors should be encouraged to
think they were in some respects different from bakers.
Lawyers, some people may be surprised
to know, originally regarded it as beneath their dignity to
charge for their services. Until very recently, in Australia,
and in England, barristers, unlike solicitors, could not sue
to recover their fees3.
This did not prevent some of them from arranging to be well
paid, and the concept that their fees were technically gratuities
was an anachronism that was properly abandoned. But the underlying
idea, that they were officers of the court exercising a privilege
of audience on behalf of litigants, is worth keeping, and
judges still insist that a lawyer's duty to the court overrides
any duty to the client.
In its widest sense, the term "profession"
can apply to any organized pursuit or calling. Even in the
narrower sense, with which this paper is concerned, it is
imprecise. In its modern meaning it undoubtedly extends beyond
the four traditional professions: medicine, law, divinity,
and the military. Indeed, it is not clear what those four
have in common that distinguishes them from others. There
is no reason why the traditional professions should resist
the extension of the concept, and every reason why they should
support it. Professions, in the narrower sense, have the following
attributes. First, they involve the exercise of some special
skill, not available to the people generally, based upon an
organized body of learning, and imparted by systematic instruction4.
Secondly, the members of the profession usually, although
not invariably, enjoy some form of exclusive right to provide
their services to the public for reward5.
Thirdly, the profession publicly avows, or professes, obligations
of service to the community and its members accept that such
obligations constrain their pursuit of individual self-interest.
Fourthly, professions are permitted, and actively pursue,
a substantial degree of self-regulation.
The third of those elements has been regarded
as vital to the difference between professions and other businesses.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor of the United States Supreme Court
said6:
- "One distinguishing feature of any profession, unlike
other occupations that may be equally respectable, is that
membership entails an ethical obligation to temper one's
selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards
of conduct that could not be enforced either by legal fiat
or through the discipline of the market".
The distinction has never been clear-cut,
but that does not mean it is unimportant.
Many businesses, and vocational groups
who do not regard themselves as professions, subscribe to
codes of conduct, or, in more modern times, service charters
and mission statements, which correspond to codes of professional
ethics. Furthermore, professional codes themselves are often
an amalgam of precepts of ethics, and etiquette, and considerations
of enlightened self-interest. Typical codes of behaviour for
lawyers, at least until recently, devoted as much attention
to prohibitions against advertising and price cutting as they
did to requirements of duty to clients and to courts. Much
of what used to be called professional ethics was an elaboration
of traditional forms of courtesy which, although not unimportant,
reflected manners which could change with time, and was not
based upon considerations of public interest. Some of the
content of professional "ethics" was also frankly anti-competitive,
and was bound to attract critical attention in an age which,
rightly, values competition as a means of promoting both the
public interest and equity with organised groups.
The distinction drawn by Justice O'Connor
was also blurred by the notorious failures of the professions
to live up to the standards they set for themselves. The shortcomings
of lawyers, in that respect, are widely known. Through the
ages, they have been celebrated in prose, verse, and popular
humour7.
An American scholar, Professor Rhode8,
observed that, throughout history, the legal profession seems
to have been permanently in decline. Noting that for more
than two thousand years commentators had been remarking on
the lowering of standards of behaviour amongst lawyers, she
concluded that, if there had been a fall from a state of grace
by the profession, it must have occurred at a very early stage
in its history.
Consider the following passage from a
work describing the decline in the standards of lawyers:
- "Some of them procured admittance into families for the
purpose of fomenting differences, of encouraging suits,
and of preparing a harvest of gain for themselves or their
brethren. Others, recluse in their chambers, maintained
the gravity of legal professors, by furnishing a rich client
with subtleties to confound the plainest truth, and with
arguments to colour the most unjustifiable pretensions Careless
of fame and justice, they are described for the most part
as ignorant and rapacious guides, who conducted their clients
through a maze of expense, of delay, and of disappointment;
from whence, after a tedious series of years, they were
at length dismissed, when their patience and fortune were
almost exhausted."
That was written by Edward Gibbon in "The
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire"9.
It was written about lawyers in Byzantium in the Third Century.
Even this history of lamentation, however,
has an encouraging side to it. Implicit in some of the criticism
of professional people, for behaviour of a kind that would
not be regarded as extraordinary, or even reprehensible, if
engaged in by people in trade or commerce generally, is an
acceptance of the idea that the public are entitled to expect
more of them.
The idea of a professional calling has
been said to involve a "cluster of belief and attitudes: a
belief that the field of work has special importance to the
public welfare; a belief that those engaged in this work can,
for better or worse, affect the public good, and that therefore
it is important that they consider themselves to be engaged
in a form of public service; a belief that the work is complex
and performing it well is not easy, and that it is important
that those performing it be competent and dedicated to performing
it at a high level; and a belief that through continuous and
collective improvement the profession can make increasingly
valuable contributions to the public good"10.
Another characteristic of a profession
used to be the idea of reputation, and eminence, within the
profession, rather than public esteem, or financial success,
as the mark of professional achievement. What doctors and
lawyers valued most was the good opinion of their peers. This,
again, was not without some negative aspects, and it was never
absolute. Some of the justifiable criticisms of the professions
are based on their tendency to be inward-looking and exclusive,
and insufficiently responsive to community values and opinion.
Further, there have always been successful professional people
who pursued public acclaim and financial success as vigorously
as any entrepreneur. Even so, a concern for the good opinion
of other members of the profession is a salutary thing, and
usually tends to promote standards of behaviour which serve
the public interest. The legal test of serious professional
misconduct is conduct which would be regarded as disgraceful
or dishonourable by right-thinking members of the profession.
Professional eminence, of course, can
be closely related to a capacity to command high fees. This
has implications both for the public interest and for equity
within the profession. The long-standing practice of formally
recognizing eminent barristers as Senior Counsel is a subject
which is at the interface between professional self-regulation
and competition policy.
In the United States, one of the major
challenges to the idea of professionalism came from the exposure
of the legal profession, and other professions, to scrutiny
under the antitrust laws11.
Professional rules against price competition and advertising
were held to be subject to the Sherman Act , and many
such rules were struck down. In Goldfarb v Virginia State
Bar12,
the Supreme Court held that a bar association's rule prescribing
minimum fees for legal services was unlawful. However, it
was not the lawyers who bore the brunt of this decision. To
a considerable extent the legal profession gained shelter
from Federal regulation because it was largely organized on
a State basis, and its rules were sanctioned and controlled
by the State Supreme Courts, lawyers being officers of those
courts. The engineers were not so well protected. Although
acknowledging that "engineering is an important and learned
profession", the Supreme Court, in National Society of
Professional Engineers v United States13in
1978, struck down consulting engineers' rules against competitive
bidding, saying14:
- "The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment
that ultimately competition will produce not only lower
prices, but better goods and services."15
In Australia, numerous professions, or sections
of professions, are being challenged to measure up to competition
policy. In the medical profession, for example, the issue of
accreditation by colleges, including accreditation of people
with overseas qualifications, is sensitive. The State of New
South Wales has agreed to review the Legal Profession Act
1987 (NSW) for conformity with national competition policy.
The procedures for the appointment of Senior Counsel are being
examined. Many other examples could be given.
One of the circumstances attracting this
kind of attention is the extent to which medical and legal
practitioners are now paid for their services from public
funds. The amount of public money devoted to legal aid is
modest compared to the amount spent on health care, but in
both areas it is inevitable that legitimate demands for accountability
will involve an attempt by governments to be assured that
they are getting value for money and that charges for professional
services are not excessive. The Government would not be doing
its job if it did not concern itself with this matter.
Governments, and regulators, and the professions
themselves, are working out the extent to which professions
must conform to a competition policy which was primarily designed
for business, and which is based upon assumptions about the
behaviour of suppliers and consumers of goods and services
that are commercial, and founded on self-interest. They will
have to address some fundamental questions. What should now
be expected of professions? Are they no more than businesses?
Are they worth keeping? If so, at what price? In answering
those questions the guiding principle must be the public interest.
Although there are areas of disagreement
about the structure of the various professions, and the way
in which they should be regulated and controlled, and there
are criticisms of what are said to be unnecessarily and inappropriately
anti-competitive aspects of their rules and practices, there
seems to be no serious challenge to the basic restriction
on competition which sustains the medical and legal professions.
Few would suggest that anybody in the community who wishes
to do so should be entitled to provide medical or legal services
to others for reward, regardless of lack of training, experience,
qualification or accreditation. In that respect, therefore,
the market for the supply of medical and legal services is
not, and no government suggests it should be, freely competitive.
In Australia, the membership of both professions is large,
and they are accessible on merit. Membership is not restricted
to people from privileged or affluent backgrounds. Both professions
have supported a substantial growth in centres of professional
training, mainly at universities. Reasonable accessibility
to the professions is an implied condition of the continued
acceptance, by the community and governments, of the monopolies
upon which the professions are based.
There is, however, argument about the
range of services to which the exclusive rights given to members
of the legal and medical professions should continue to apply.
Proposals that people other than qualified doctors and lawyers
should be able to provide certain medical and legal services
will continue to generate debate, but they are not central
to the theme of this paper. So long as it is accepted that
doctors and lawyers will continue to have the exclusive right
to provide some services, then that condition of the continuation
of the professions will continue to exist.
Granted their existence, however, there
remain issues as to role and purpose of the professions, their
structure and governance, accreditation, and regulation. Accepting
that doctors and lawyers are worth having, that some of their
skills are indispensable, and that it is in the public interest
that they should retain the exclusive right to supply some
services, it does not necessarily follow that they should
continue to function, organize and regulate themselves, and
be treated as professions, rather than guilds, unions, or
trade associations. There is a question whether they should
be permitted to associate at all; or at least to associate
along the traditional lines of a profession.
If, to the proposition that the professions
are now businesses, and ought to behave and be treated accordingly,
there is added nothing more than a grudging acceptance of
the minimal necessity to prohibit people other than qualified
and accredited doctors and lawyers from providing certain
kinds of health care or legal services, then what purpose
is served by having a medical profession or a legal profession?
Why should the government not simply license doctors and lawyers,
giving them the minimum monopoly rights consistent with the
safety and interest of the public, and otherwise forbid any
form of association and self-regulation going beyond that
lawfully available to any other trade association?
It appears that most members of the community
do not believe that professions are merely businesses. At
all events, very few people seem willing to follow such a
proposition through to its logical conclusion. Governments
and regulators continue to act as though they accept that
the professions are worth keeping. Unless they hold that view,
in challenging particular aspects of professional organisation,
but otherwise permitting the professions to continue to function
as self-regulating entities, they are straining at gnats and
swallowing a camel.
Insofar as the argument relates to the
structure, governance and regulation of the professions, rather
than their very existence, another question demands consideration.
What level or degree of governmental or other outside participation
in the affairs of an organization is consistent with its continued
existence as a profession?
In practice, political decision-making
does not usually operate at this level of principle. Questions
of expediency and, above all, cost, play a role in determining
how far any push against self-regulation by the professions
is likely to be taken. What government would seriously want
to take over the responsibility of regulating the medical
profession? Self-regulation involves a large amount of unpaid
work by people whose time is valuable. An attempt to bureaucratise
the process would involve substantial cost to government,
for little evident benefit. The same economic rationalism
which provokes demands for more accountability by the professions
also tempers any enthusiasm for taking over the responsibility
of running them.
Where does the public interest lie? Can
it be that the best argument in favour of keeping the professions
is that it would be costly to replicate by governmental action
much of the work they do? I would answer that question in
the negative. However, I would be willing to make a substantial
concession, which is demanded by considerations of reason
and practicality.
Because of the exclusive right to provide
some services which the law confers upon doctors and lawyers,
the public rightly expect that they will accept collective
responsibility to do what, within their powers, they are able
to do, to ensure reasonable public access to those services.
No factor more directly affects public access to services
of any kind than the cost of those services.
It is here that competition policy is
intended to have its main impact. (It is also aimed at assisting
to achieve greater equity within the professions, but that
is a separate issue). Whatever may have been the case in past
times, it is now clear that the public can no longer rely
solely on collective or individual restraint on the part of
professional people to keep fees at levels which mean that
their services are generally available.
Some points need to be made in order to
put the matter of fees into perspective. First, nobody is
entitled to expect that the services of a leading Queen's
Counsel will be available, at an affordable price, to any
person who wants to litigate in any case, large or small.
Secondly, the fees charged by even the most successful lawyers
are often considerably lower than the fees charged by some
providers of financial advice and services. Thirdly, self-employed
people who charge on the basis of their time are limited in
what they can earn by the availability of time. Fourthly,
it is misleading to use the fees charged by the most senior
and successful members of the profession as an indication
of the fee levels that apply generally throughout the profession.
Fifthly, the individuals and corporations who engage the services
of the leaders of the legal profession are usually, (although
not always), able to look after their own interests.
That having been said, professional fees
have such an important bearing on access to justice, or to
health care, that the public, and governments, have a legitimate
concern about mechanisms to ensure their reasonableness.
Price control is no longer accepted as
a practical method of dealing with the problem. There was
a time, not long ago, when courts fixed scales of fees charged
in litigation. Similar scales applied to other legal services,
such as conveyancing and probate. Ultimately, however, this
came to be seen to be a clumsy and ineffectual process, as
price control usually is. There may be still be limited instances
in which scales can perform useful functions, but bureaucratic
regulation of fees for services is not a solution likely to
appeal in the twenty-first century. This leads to the concession
which has to be made.
It is impossible to resist the argument
that the community must look to the process of competition
for systematic and long-term constraint in the pricing of
professional services. In the market for professional services,
providers, naturally, will want to maximise, or at least,
optimise, their incomes. If permitted to fix their prices
by agreement between themselves, and confront consumers with
charges struck accordingly, they, or many of them, will seek
to do so.
To acknowledge this, however, is not to
accept that competition alone is sufficient to safeguard the
interests of the public.
The effectiveness of competition as a
mechanism for limiting professional fees, at least in the
legal profession, varies. In the case of relatively standardised
services, such as conveyancing and probate, or routine litigation,
where there are a large number of potential service providers,
and a reasonably level playing field, competition has had
a substantial effect on fee levels. At the other extreme,
there are some areas of legal practice, including major litigation,
and some corporate and financial advising, where the cost
of legal services is , by any reckoning, high.
There is one important respect in which
competition theory, in its application to some professional
services, does not correspond with reality. Consumers of professional
services are often not well placed to decide for themselves
the extent of their need for services. Consider, for example,
in the area of medical practice, the matter of diagnostic
services. How is competition likely to prevent over-servicing?
How can patients, as consumers, make a judgment as to their
need for diagnostic services? In the area of legal practice,
major litigation provides a good example of a similar problem.
Most solicitors now charge at hourly rates. The rates charged
by competing solicitors are readily compared, but what is
equally important is the number of billable hours to which
those rates are applied. Even the most sophisticated client
is likely to be at a disadvantage in making a judgment about
the reasonableness of the time spent by the solicitor on various
aspects of the case.
Apart form over-servicing, there are other
aspects of professional behaviour to which competition can
provide only a limited and unsatisfactory solution. Frequently,
the playing field is not level. Some providers of services,
because of their personal skill or reputation, are in a position
to act almost without competitive constraint. Furthermore,
some practices concerning the method by which fees are set,
known in other countries, but still regarded as impermissible
in Australia, could readily be undertaken by some professionals
here if they were at liberty to do so.
There may be many grounds for complaining
about lawyers' or doctors' fees, but it is worthwhile considering
what some of them might do if they were not constrained by
standards of professional behaviour.
Reliance on competition alone is insufficient.
The constraint upon the pursuit of self-interest which is
an essential aspect of professionalism also provides a necessary
form of protection for consumers of services. Let me give
a practical example, concerning the issue of contingency fees
in litigation. Many lawyers in New South Wales have, for a
long time, in one particular area of practice, operated on
the basis of contingency fees. They are lawyers who act for
plaintiffs in claims for damages for personal injury. This
has had a significant and generally beneficial effect on access
to justice. However, the practices adopted by some United
States lawyers in relation to the method of charging contingency
fees have never been regarded as professionally acceptable
in Australia. As the charging of contingency fees becomes
more widespread, then the controls imposed by standards of
professional behaviour, including the need to avoid conflicts
of interest, have become more, not less, important.
The setting and enforcement of standards
of professional behaviour in relation to matters other than
fees will also continue to be at least as important in the
future as in the past. In particular, the development and
policing of ethical standards, and standards of competence,
will remain a vital role of the professions. Consider, for
instance, the ethical challenges which the medical profession
will face in the next ten or twenty years. Some of these will,
no doubt, be examined in other papers to be given at the Conference.
Can it seriously be denied that a strong, effective and independent
profession, with an historic sense of duty, is essential to
a resolution of those issues in the public interest?
Both the medical and the legal professions
need, at the present time, to give more, not less, attention
to the formulation and refinement of their ethical standards,
and to the promotion of those standards amongst their members.
The leaders of the professions, and those responsible for
professional education, may need to engage in some self-examination
about this matter. How clear are the ethical standards of
the professions at the moment? What systematic instruction
in those standards is given to members of the professions?
At least in relation to the medical profession, others are
better informed about the answers to those questions. It is
to be hoped, however, that someone is asking them.
The idea of professionalism is as important
now as it ever was. It should be reinforced, not devalued.
Members of the traditional professions should not see themselves
as jealously preserving ancient privileges. They should support
other vocations wishing to take up the idea. The status of
a profession should not be a badge of exclusivity. Rather,
it should be seen as an acceptance of responsibility, and
encouraged. Provided they understand the reason for their
existence, and accept that the public interest is the ultimate
test of the legitimacy of their practices, the professions
are more necessary than ever, and well worth keeping.
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The Hon Murray Gleeson AC, Chief Justice of Australia.
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| 1 |
Russell G Pearce, New York University Law Review,
Vol 70, No 6, Dec 1995, pp 1229-1276.
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| 2 |
Justice Santow, however, in Prestia v Aknar ,
Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, unreported,
30 April 1996 saw a difference.
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| 3 |
For the historical explanation, see Rondel v Worseley
[1967] 3 WLR 1666.
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| 4 |
Not, however, necessarily involving university education.
To this day, admission to practice as a lawyer in New
South Wales does not require a university degree.
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| 5 |
eg Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 48B, Medical
Practice Act 1992 (NSW) s 104, 105.
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| 6 |
Shapero v Kentucky Bar Association (1988) 486
US 466 at 488.
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| 7 |
Scriptural castigation of "lawyers", however, should
be understood in the light of the fact that the lawyers
there referred to were the counterparts of the modern
clergy, not of barristers and solicitors.
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| 8 |
Deborah L Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, William
and Maris Law Review Vol 39 No 2 Jan 1998 p 283.
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| 9 |
Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
Vol 1, Ch 17, p 245.
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| 10 |
Carl T Bogus, "The Death of an Honorable Profession",
(1996) Indiana Law Journal, Vol 71, p 911 at 937-938.
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| 11 |
For a detailed examination of this subject, see Thomas
D Morgan, The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession,
1998, 67 Fordham Law Review, 415.
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| 12 |
421 US 773.
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| 13 |
435 US 679.
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| 14 |
435 US 679 at 695.
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| 15 |
See also Federal Trade Commission v Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Association 493 US 411, 1989. |
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