AUSTRALIAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE
PARIS 8 JULY 2002
GLOBAL INFLUENCES ON THE AUSTRALIAN JUDICIARY
MURRAY GLEESON*
In an open society, a nation's legal system, and
its judiciary, will always be exposed to international influences.
Even when unrecognised, or unacknowledged, they will
be reflected in the substantive and adjectival law applied
by judges, in the structure and status of the judiciary,
and in its relationship with the other branches of government.
The original, and formative, influence on Australia’s
legal culture came from Great Britain.
For more than 150 years Australia was part of the
British Empire.
By receiving the common law from England, Australia
became part of an international legal community that included
the United States, India, Canada, Ireland and New Zealand.
The principles and procedures of the common law helped
shape the societies in which it was received.
And it left its distinctive stamp upon the judiciary
and the legal profession in those societies.
Some Australian lawyers who respond eagerly to new
forces of globalisation, and others who resist foreign influence,
appear to forget that our legal system developed as part
of a great international network.
The early barristers in the colony of New South Wales
(which originally included the whole of the eastern part
of mainland Australia) had been admitted to practise in
England or Ireland. Until
1861, all judges in the colony had been members of the English
or Irish Bar. New
South Wales did not have an Australian born Chief Justice
until 1910. Until
quite recently, members of the English Bar were automatically
entitled to be admitted to the Bar of New South Wales.
Before the enactment of the Australia
Act 1986 (Cth and UK), the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council was part of Australia's judicial structure.
In 1968, and again in 1975, the Commonwealth
Parliament legislated to limit appeals to the Privy
Council, but it was not until 1986 that they were completely
blocked. Writing in 1901, Quick and Garran observed that the power of the
Privy Council was "not unfelt by any judge in the Empire" [1] . In 1981, Hutley JA of the New South Wales Court
of Appeal referred to the "English leadership"
under which the Australian law of torts and contracts developed. He said [2] :
"In a relatively
provincial country (though very litigious) such as Australia,
the tendency to lapse into self-satisfaction has been restrained
by the continual presence of a major legal system, not as
a distant exemplar, but as a continual force for change".
While they continued, appeals to the Privy Council
had an effect at a personal, as well as an institutional,
level. Justices
of the High Court used to sit from time to time with the
Law Lords. The last
two to do that were Sir Harry Gibbs and Sir Ninian Stephen.
And Australian barristers used to argue cases before
the most senior English judges, and against leaders of the
English Bar.
Using the term "constitution" in its broadest
sense, the common law of England provided the basis of our
constitutional arrangements. Parliamentary democracy, judicial independence,
the open administration of justice, legal professional privilege,
the presumption of innocence, freedom from arbitrary arrest
or imprisonment, the right to silence, and other principles
we regard as fundamental to the way we are governed, came
to us as part of our common law inheritance.
More specifically, the Commonwealth Constitution
was in many respects, a product of foreign precedent.
It took legal effect as an enactment of the United
Kingdom Parliament, but it was drafted in the federating
colonies by people who looked mainly to the experience of
the United States for guidance in framing the terms of their
federal agreement. At the end of the 19th century, there were
only three precedents for a federal Constitution. The Swiss example provided little assistance, while the Canadian
model involved a scheme of distribution of powers between
the central and the provincial governments that was not
acceptable. Following the United States precedent, our Constitution contains
a more sharply defined separation of legislative, executive
and judicial powers than has ever existed in the United
Kingdom. The explanation
lies in the nature of federalism, and the necessity that
the judicial arm of government, which determines the boundaries
of power sharing marked out by the federal agreement, should
be clearly separated from the federal legislature and executive.
The constitutional assumption that a court can declare
legislation enacted by the Parliament to be invalid was
familiar in the case of colonial legislatures with limited
powers. But it had
been taken up in the United States as an aspect of federalism. The principle established by Marbury v Madison [3] was taken for granted by the time our
Constitution was drafted.
At the same time, we followed the United Kingdom
precedent in certain respects. We were, and remain, a constitutional monarchy.
Responsible government, difficult to reconcile with federalism,
reflects English, rather than American, precedent. And, to a large extent, the framers of our Constitution, unlike
their American counterparts, left it largely to Parliament
to protect the rights and freedoms of Australian citizens.
By contrast, the American approach was to protect
rights and freedoms by giving them constitutional status,
and thus placing them beyond legislative reach.
This is a subject to which more recent international
developments have a particular relevance.
Having decided, at the time of Federation, to follow
the British example, and leave it mainly to Parliament to
decide how, and to what extent, the rights of citizens should
be protected, Australia now finds that the United Kingdom
has committed itself to a different course.
While still retaining the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy, the United Kingdom, by enacting the Human
Rights Act 1998 (UK), has made the European Convention
on Human Rights part of its basic law.
Lord Steyn, in March 2002, described the Convention
as effectively the United Kingdom's constitutional Bill
of Rights, and said that the incorporation of the Convention
into English law has generally accelerated the constitutionalisation
of public law [4] .
This development was not sudden.
Since 1966, citizens of the United Kingdom have had
the right to petition the European Court of Human Rights,
and the Convention has influenced the development of the
common law. But
with the introduction of the Human Rights Act, what was
previously an influence is now a direct force.
Australia now finds that the common law countries
whose jurisprudence has most influenced its common law,
i.e. the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and New
Zealand, have all adopted wide ranging constitutional or
legislative declarations of human rights and freedoms.
Those declarations directly affect the development
of the common law in those countries.
It is inevitable that they will have an indirect
influence on the development of the common law in Australia.
Consider, for example, judicial review of executive
action. It is fair to say, that, both in the United Kingdom and in Australia,
administrative law has been in a state of continuing development
over the last 50 years.
The decisions of English courts, although not binding,
have been carefully considered, and often followed, in Australia.
But now there has occurred a significant change.
The focus of administrative law in the United Kingdom
has become, not the responsibilities of officials, but the
rights of citizens. It remains to be seen how much of this change
will find its way into Australian law.
That will work itself out over time.
But the human rights jurisprudence of the other major
common law jurisdictions will naturally be closely watched
by Australian courts.
There is another mechanism by which human rights
jurisprudence affects Australian law:
through international treaties and conventions.
As in the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand,
the provisions of an international treaty do not form part
of Australian law unless they have been incorporated into
municipal law by statute [5] . However, international treaties to which Australia
is a party may indirectly affect the development of the
law in Australia.
Courts may use international treaties and conventions
in resolving uncertainties in the common law.
In Mabo v Queensland [No 2] Brennan J said
[6] :
"The common law does
not necessarily conform with international law, but international
law is a legitimate and important influence on the development
of the common law, especially when international law declares
the existence of human rights".
The decision in Mabo
provides a notable example of the High Court of Australia
developing the common law in response to the forces of globalisation.
Brennan J described the previous refusal to recognise
the rights and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants
as an unjust and discriminatory doctrine that could no longer
be accepted in the light of Australia's accession to the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. He said [7] :
"A common law doctrine
founded on unjust discrimination in the enjoyment of civil
and political rights demands reconsideration".
There is no event in Australia's recent legal history
that more vividly illustrates the effect on Australian law
of developments in international human rights jurisprudence
than the decision in Mabo
and the subsequent legislative response to that decision.
In resolving ambiguity in a statute, courts favour
a construction which accords with Australia's obligations
under a treaty, on the basis that they presume that Parliament
intends to legislate in accordance with, rather than contrary
to, its international obligations [8] .
It is unnecessary for present purposes to go into
the more controversial area of the circumstances in which
ratification by Australia of an international convention
will give rise to a legitimate expectation that an administrative
decision-maker will conform to the convention.
In a paper given at a judicial conference at Launceston
in April 2002, Perry J, of the Supreme Court of South Australia,
commented that Australian counsel rarely refer judges to
international legal materials that might have a bearing
on a case. If that
is so, it is unfortunate, and suggests that our advocates
may be less sensitive to the potential importance of such
materials than their European counterparts. Part of the explanation may be that, for lawyers
in Europe including the United Kingdom, the Treaty of Rome,
and the European Convention on Human Rights, are in one
sense supra-national, but in another sense, they are the
law of a community to which they all belong. Perhaps, to a barrister in London, Strasbourg
is no more foreign than Canberra is to a barrister in Perth. It is certainly much closer. But I believe there is a growing awareness,
within the Australian profession, of the importance of looking
beyond our own statutes and precedents, and our traditional
sources, in formulating answers to legal problems.
Our law is increasingly aware of, and responsive
to, the guidance we can receive from civil law countries.
Ultimately, the issues that arise, and the problems
that require solution, are in many respects the same throughout
large parts of the world.
The forces of globalisation tend to standardise the
questions to which a legal system must respond.
It is only to be expected that there will be an increasing
standardisation of the answers.
An example of a civil law principle that
has entered the law of England through Europe, and is becoming
influential in Australia, is proportionality.
The modern principle appears to be of German origin,
although in France, Art 8 of the Declaration
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 provides that laws
may only create penalties that are "strictly and evidently
necessary". In
its narrowest sense, proportionality requires that a measure
must not be disproportionate to its aim.
It is a familiar aspect of European Community law,
operating as a limit both upon Community action and upon
state action that applies, or is required to conform to,
Community law. In
1998 it was expressed as follows [9] :
[T]he principle of proportionality,
which is one of the general principles of Community law,
requires that measures adopted by Community institutions
do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary
in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by
the legislation in question; when there is a choice between
several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the
least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be
disproportionate to the aims pursued".
Article 5 of the Maastricht Treaty states that "[a]ny
action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary
to achieve the objectives of this Treaty".
Some object to this principle as a basis for judicial
review of either legislative or administrative action because
of the extent to which it may allow courts a capacity to
examine policy as distinct from legality. In its practical effect, the principle of proportionality is modified
by a complementary principle which allows a "margin
of appreciation", or what might in some contexts be
called "deference", to the judgment of the relevant
legislative or administrative authority.
A number of the articles of the European Convention
on Human Rights contain provisions which expressly invoke
proportionality. For example, rights to respect for private and family life, to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion, and to freedom of expression,
assembly and association, are not absolute, but any interference
with them may only be such as is necessary in a democratic
society for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or the protection of the rights of others [10] .
The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees specified
rights and freedoms, subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.
In R v Oakes [11] Dickson CJC said that it must be shown:
"[T]hat the means
chosen [to attain the objective] are reasonable and demonstrably
justified. This involves 'a form of proportionality test'
… Although the nature
of the proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances,
in each case courts will be required to balance the interests
of society with those of individuals and groups".
Even before the enactment of the Human
Rights Act 1998, English courts were familiar with proportionality. The concept has much in common with that of
reasonableness and, in its practical operation in many cases,
it is likely to produce the same result as would come from
the application of a test of reasonableness [12] . But, of course, the concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness is narrower.
In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [13] , Lord
Diplock raised the possibility of importing the European
concept of proportionality as a ground of domestic judicial
review, but this was rejected by the House of Lords in R
v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Brind [14] . However, when the English courts apply
Community law, and the Human
Rights Act 1998, questions of proportionality arise.
Australian law, so far to a limited extent, has applied
the concept of proportionality; and not just through the
related and familiar concept of reasonableness.
In constitutional cases where a purposive head of
legislative power is relied upon, proportionality has been
invoked as a test of the sufficiency of the connection between
the law and the head of power. In Commonwealth v Tasmania [15] ,
Deane J asked whether the law was appropriate and adapted
to achieving the object that was said to make it a law with
respect to external affairs. In this regard, he said, there was a need for
"a reasonable proportionality between the designated
purpose or object and the means which the law embodies for
achieving or procuring it." On the other hand, in Leask
v The Commonwealth [16] both Dawson and Toohey JJ were critical
of the use of proportionality as a test of whether legislation
was within constitutional power.
Where a law is said to infringe some express or implied
right or guarantee of freedom, then considerations which
have much in common with proportionality are familiar.
And in testing whether subordinate legislation has
been made within statutory power, a question may arise whether
a regulation is so lacking in reasonable proportionality
as not to be an exercise of the power [17] .
However, so far proportionality has not been accepted
in Australia as a separate ground for judicial review of
administrative action, although the possibility was raised
by Deane J in Australian
Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [18] .
Proportionality is simply a concrete and topical
example of the influence on the judiciary of ideas borrowed
from the jurisprudence of other countries. Such ideas are not limited to matters of substantive
law.
One of the characteristic differences between common
law and civil law countries is in the matter of judicial
recruitment and formation. Lawyers in civil law countries who enter the judiciary typically
do so at a relatively early age and as a lifelong career. In common law countries, judges, especially
senior judges, are typically appointed in middle age, usually
from the ranks of legal practitioners.
But in one respect they are now following a civil
law precedent. All
the major common law nations, including Australia, now have
established, formal, programs of judicial formation and
development. In this they are following the example of civil
law countries, where formal training is a necessary preparation
for undertaking a judicial career.
The leading organisations in this area in Australia
have been the Judicial Commission of New South Wales and
the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration.
An Australian Judicial College is in the course of
establishment, with the support of the Commonwealth government
and the governments of New South Wales and South Australia.
In recent years there has been a pronounced move
towards greater interaction among the judiciary internationally.
This has not been confined, as in the past, by a
division between judges from countries with a civil law
tradition, and judges from common law countries. Europe itself embodies some of the leading
examples of both traditions.
Engagement between Australian judges and
their overseas counterparts, whether of a civil law or common
law background, is essential.
There are numerous forums at which exchanges of information
and opinions take place. For example, under the auspices of LAWASIA,
the Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific meet every two
years. Those meeting are attended by, amongst others,
the Chief Justices of Japan, the People's Republic of China,
India, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia, Russia, Hong Kong,
Australia and New Zealand. At a meeting in Beijing in 1995, the Chief
Justices of the region adopted a Statement of Principles
of the Independence of the Judiciary which is of major importance.
The very name of the Beijing Statement on Judicial
Independence reflects the significance of international
co-operation among judges. The Worldwide Common Law Judiciary
Conference is a biennial event. The next such conference will be held in Sydney in April 2003.
It will be attended by judges from the United Kingdom,
the United States, Canada, India, Pakistan, Australia and
New Zealand and other common law jurisdictions.
The Australian judiciary is active in
judicial formation and development in the Asia Pacific region. For the last three years, the Federal Court
has conducted an annual training program for the Indonesian
judiciary with the assistance of financial grants from AUSAID's
Government Sector Linkages Program.
Australian judges have conducted training workshops
in Indonesia and groups of Indonesian judges visit Australia
regularly on study tours.
Training courses for visiting judges have been provided
by the Judicial Commission of New South Wales.
Since 1999, the Federal Court has engaged
in judicial exchange activities with the Supreme Court of
the Philippines. In
cooperation with the Centre for Democratic Institutions
at the Australian National University, the Federal Court
has hosted visit by groups of judges from the Philippines
and has sent Australian judges to conduct training workshops
in that country.
The Centre for Democratic Institutions,
the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law Studies at the University
of Sydney, the Judicial Commission of New South Wales and
the Federal Court have also provided judicial development
activities in conjunction with the Supreme Peoples' Court
of Vietnam. A program
of judicial exchange has been established, and Australian
judges have lectured at judicial schools in Hanoi.
A number of Australian courts have established relations,
and judicial exchange, with courts of the People's Republic
of China. Judges
and court officials from each country have made regular
visits since 1998. The
Federal Court has been involved in training activities with
judges of the Thai Court of Intellectual Property in Trade
and has received visits from members of that court.
The Judicial Commission of New South Wales, in conjunction
with the AIJA, for the past seven years has conducted a
National Judicial Orientation Courts for judges from around
Australia. Judges
from Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Indonesia
have participated in that course.
Australian courts participate in schemes to provide
library and legal resource assistance to a number of courts
in the South Pacific.
These activities receive little public notice.
But they represent an important form of engagement
between the Australian judiciary and the judiciary of other
nations, especially in the Asia Pacific region.
Engagement of that kind enhances the level of performance
of Australian judges. It also fosters, internationally, values of
judicial independence, competence, and integrity. The importance of those values is now widely accepted. A number of countries in our region have active
programs of judicial reform; and Australia accepts an obligation
to contribute to these.
We also accept that there are valuable lessons for
us to learn from others.