OPENING ADDRESS BY THE HON. JUSTICE
K.M. HAYNE, AC
AT THE CENTRE FOR COMMERCIAL LAW
CONFERENCE 2002
"COMMERCIAL LAW PRIVATE
BUSINESS/PUBLIC CONCERN"
MONDAY, 30 SEPTEMBER 2002
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
The publicity material for this Conference
said that its theme covered "contemporary issues,
such as the insurance crisis and the problem of unpaid
workers' entitlements" but was "also intended
to cover longstanding issues, such as the extent to
which commercial law should be regulated or left to
private agreements". Several questions were
posed. "Is there a need for government regulation
of commercial dealings? What form should that regulation
take? Even if commercial law is regarded as essentially
private, is there nevertheless a place for 'public'
concepts, such as good faith etc?"
I do not intend to trespass upon any of
the particular fields which the several speakers intend
to cover. Rather, I want to invite attention to another
way in which the topics which you are to consider
may be viewed.
In 1927, Atkin LJ said1 that to introduce consideration of equitable concepts
dividing legal and beneficial interests in property
to the sale of goods would introduce "disastrous
innovations" into what he identified as "well
settled commercial relations". One wonders what
his Lordship would have made of the subsequent emergence
of retention of title clauses of the kind considered
in Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106
Pty Ltd (In liq)2.
By contrast, more than 70 years later,
Sir Anthony Mason observed that equitable doctrines
based on unconscionable conduct had played a prominent
part in, and made an important contribution towards,
the breaking down of the more rigid rules of common
law3.
These differing views represent radically
different approaches to commercial law. It would
do justice to neither approach to attempt to encapsulate
them in some snappy catch phrase like "the freedom
of private contract versus the imposition of minimum
standards of behaviour". The problems that are
presented, and the solutions that must be adopted
in response to those problems, are much more complicated
and subtle than such a simple antinomy suggests.
In 1978, Atiyah developed the thesis that
modern law had moved away from the application of
general principles towards what he described as a
search for individualised justice4.
Perhaps this trend can now be seen most clearly in
statute law. More and more statutes provide for discretionary
solutions guided by very broad aspirational statements
of principle. And the fields in which there is statutory
regulation grow ever wider as each increasingly large
volume of statutes is published. Behind much of this
legislation lie certain unexpressed premises
that every case is different but that there are some
generally accepted standards of fairness against which
every case should be tested. The consequence is,
as Chief Justice Gleeson has pointed out5:
"we can no longer say that, in all but exceptional
cases, the rights and liabilities of parties to a
written contract can be discovered by reading the
contract." To lawyers of Atkin's generation
this would have been heresy. How has it come about?
There are two principal influences at work.
First, there is the influence to which I have already
referred the ever increasing importance of
statute. The significance of this shift from common
law to statute cannot be overestimated. It is, I
think, the most fundamental change that has occurred
in the law in the last 40 years and it is a change
that is still happening. As I have said, many statutes
use as their criteria of operation terms like "fair"
or "just" or "unconscionable".
The second influence is the application, some would
say the intrusion, of equitable principles to commercial
dealings. It is to the second of these influences
that I wish to devote a little attention this morning.
Sir Peter Millett, now Lord Millett, identified6 three reasons for concluding
that "[e]quity's place in the law of commerce,
long resisted by commercial lawyers, can no longer
be denied"7.
First, there is the increasing complexity and professionalisation
of commercial life and the fact that on each side
of a commercial transaction there will very likely
be relationships of trust and confidence. Secondly,
he considered that "there has never been a greater
need to impose on those who engage in commerce the
high standards of conduct which equity demands"8
loyalty, fidelity, integrity, respect for confidentiality,
and the disinterested discharge of obligations of
trust and confidence. The third factor he identified
was the profession's discovery of the apparent advantages
of alleging breaches of trust or fiduciary duty with
the result that a statement of claim was to be considered
seriously deficient if it did not contain reference
to those concepts.
In Australia, the same may be said of references
to Pt V of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth). No pleading is regarded as sufficient without
some reference to misleading or deceptive conduct.
But in Australia, too, frequent reference is made
to breach of trust or fiduciary duty in connection
with commercial transactions. Two examples of that,
which have reached the High Court, are Hospital
Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation9 and Pilmer v The Duke Group Ltd (In
liq)10.
Leaving aside the particular content of
the two decisions that I have just mentioned (for
the reasons of the Court must speak for themselves)
it is, I think, the common experience of judges sitting
in commercial lists that expressions like "fiduciary"
and "unconscionable" are sprinkled through
pleadings or submissions much as caster sugar is sprinkled
upon a bowl of strawberries in the hope that the consumer
may find the dish more palatable. All too often the
attachment of the label "fiduciary" ignores
the dictum of Frankfurter J11:
"to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins
analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry.
To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does
he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed
to discharge these obligations? And what are the
consequences of his deviation from duty?" As
Finn said in his seminal work on fiduciary obligations12: "[i]t is not because a person
is a 'fiduciary' or a 'confidant' that a rule applies
to him. It is because a particular rule applies to
him that he is a fiduciary or confidant for its purposes".
That is, a fiduciary is not subject to fiduciary obligations
because he or she is a fiduciary; it is because he
or she is subject to fiduciary obligations that he
or she is a fiduciary. And, of course, it is always
necessary to bear steadily in mind that not every
breach of duty by a fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary
duty.
Yet, to a greater or lesser extent these
basic principles of law are ignored or discarded when
parties seek to apply equitable doctrine to commercial
relationships. The language of equity is applied
but sometimes without close attention to the content
of the principles that it seeks to invoke.
There is a connection between the appeal
to equitable principles, as if they entitled the provision
of relief in any and every case to which some pejorative
adjective like "unfair" could be applied,
and the debate about discretionary remedialism. That
debate is said to reflect a contest between precision
and predictability in the law and what is seen as
individualised and substantive justice rooted in broad
common values of society. Often enough those values
are said to be reflected in the concept of unconscionability.
As you know, Professor Birks condemns discretionary
remedialism. For him, "[t]he lawyer who deals
in 'unconscionable behaviour' is rather like the ornithologist
who is content with 'small brown bird' ... Like 'fair'
or 'just', the word 'unconscionable' is so unspecific
that it simply conceals private and intuitive evaluation"13.
In part this debate about discretionary
remedialism may well be overtaken by the legislature.
Legislation like Pt IVA of the Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Cth) and the Contracts Review Act
1980 (NSW) depends for its operation upon terms
like "unconscionable", "unconscionable,
harsh or oppressive". But the use of these terms
in legislation leaves many questions to be answered.
How are those principles to be applied? What is their
content? Is their content sufficiently identified
by saying that conduct is "unconscionable"
if it would "offend society"14? Are these doctrines to be applied
only in cases where there is some relevant disparity
in bargaining power between parties? How is one to
measure bargaining power?
I do not say that these are questions that
cannot be answered but it is important to recognise
that the broad and general specification of standards
to be applied does not provide the answer to any inquiry
it presents the starting point for much deeper
and more difficult inquiries requiring the articulation
of what it is about a particular event or transaction
that warrants the application of the relevant description.
Apart from the problems of first identifying
the content of rules expressed in this general way,
and then determining the circumstances in which they
are to be applied, there is a further set of problems
to which proper attention may not always be given.
There are cases where what is done by a person is
clearly contrary to community standards. Usually,
if that conduct is significant, it is classified as
criminal or as a civil wrong. Those cases apart,
the condemnation of particular kinds of conduct as
unworthy or inappropriate not only assumes that the
standard against which it is to be judged can be identified,
it also assumes that all of the obligations of and
pressures on the individual concerned have been identified.
Neither is self‑evidently true. If the behaviour
is not criminal and is not a civil wrong, is it clear
that society condemns it? Before condemning a particular
kind of conduct, are we sure that we know enough of
the circumstances in which it was done?
Thus, in a commercial context, what, if
any, weight is to be given to the fact that a company
director, and those employed by a company, are bound
to pursue the commercial advantage of that company.
Reducing the proposition to its simplest and crudest
terms, if there is a profit to be made, they should
seek to maximise it. Specifying limits to that obligation
by saying "maximise profit, but only where it
is fair to do so" affects not only those who
are the parties to a transaction that is impugned,
it affects all those who have some interest in the
fortunes of the company concerned employees,
creditors, shareholders. The policy questions thus
presented have more than one dimension. Debate about
them may not always recognise that fact.
It is, I think, now far too late to long
for those simpler days when introducing equitable
principles into well‑settled principles of commercial
relations could be described as a disastrous innovation.
It is too late because it has happened and it is too
late because society, and the transaction of business
in society, either has become more complicated or
we have come to recognise better the complications
that attend their regulation. No longer can business
transactions be seen as matters wholly for private
agreement in which the only functions of the law are
to facilitate and enforce bargains. But the injection
of public standards or public regulation of such transactions
must recognise that it is not sufficient to sprinkle
qualitative descriptions of behaviour leaving parties,
lawyers and courts to debate what effect is to be
given to them. It is necessary to look carefully
at all of the questions that arise. For legislators
there will be a wide range of policy issues to consider.
For lawyers the statement of a standard in broad and
qualitative terms presents many questions which must
be identified and answered.
Today's Conference will, I am sure, assist
in identifying the relevant questions and assist in
the debate about the answers that should be given
to them.
1 In re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606 at
640-641.
3 Mason, "The Impact of Equitable
Doctrine on the Law of Contract", (1998) 27
Anglo American Law Review 1 at 28.
4 Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism,
(1978) at 15 referred to in Gleeson, "Individualised
Justice The Holy Grail", (1995) 69 Australian
Law Journal 421.
5 Gleeson, "Individualised Justice
The Holy Grail", (1995) 69 Australian
Law Journal 421 at 428.
6 Millett, "Equity's Place in the
Law of Commerce", (1988) 114 Law Quarterly
Review 214 at 216-217.
7 (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 214
at 216.
8 (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 214
at 216.
10 (2001) 75 ALJR 1067; 180 ALR 249.
11 Securities and Exchange Commission
v Chenery Corporation 318 US 80 at 85-86 (1942).
12 Finn, Fiduciary Obligations,
(1977) at 2.
13 Birks, "Equity in the Modern Law:
An Exercise in Taxonomy", (1996) 26 Western
Australian Law Review 1 at 16-17. See also
Birks, "Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary
Remedialism", (2000) 29 Western Australian
Law Review 1; cf Evans, "Defending Discretionary
Remedialism", (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review
463.
14 Mason, "The Impact of Equitable
Doctrine on the Law of Contract", (1998) 27
Anglo American Law Review 1 at 12.