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Speeches
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION
LAUNCH OF
REFORM
AUTUMN EDITION 1998 - ISSUE 72
TUESDAY, 7 APRIL 1998, SYDNEY
VALUE JUDGMENTS: THE ETHICS OF LAW
The Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG
1
BIRTH OF REFORM
I am now so ancient that I can boast that I was present at
the birth of Reform, the journal . It happened
this way. In 1975 my brother, Donald, now a seasoned Sydney
solicitor, gave me a beautiful Daumier print. It showed an
irascible old judge in France who was sufficiently ill-mannered
to wear his decorations into court. In the funny way these
things happen, I immediately conceived of how I could share
this fine etching with a wide legal audience. The glaring
eyes. The downturned mouth. The ferocious appearance. It looked
remarkably like several judges of my acquaintance. I knew
that my reaction would be shared by members of the legal profession.
And so Reform, like many babies before and since,
was accidentally born. I apologised to its readers for "still
more literature for the lawyer to read"
2 . I stated that the
journal, like law reform, must "seek the participation
and interest of the profession". "Take heart"
I urged the readers. "Remember this: it is designed to
be read and thrown away. In due course ... a proper format
will be designed and glossy photographs of persons prominent
in law reform may even be introduced". Some readers thought
I was joking.
The main news item in the first issue of Reform
was the election of new governments in Australia and New Zealand.
Mrhad just been confirmed in office in Canberra. The new federal
Attorney-General, with Methodist zeal for law reform, was
Bob Ellicott QC.
The basic structure of Reform has remained remarkably
unchanged since that first edition more than twenty years
ago. There is news on the nation and on the world of law reform.
There is reference to High Court and other relevant authority.
There are reports on the activities of law reform agencies
throughout Australia and overseas. Some book reviews of relevance
to law reform are noted, together with items on the people
playing a part in law reform. There was no Advisory Committee
for Reform in those days. Most staff members regarded
it as the Chairman's folly. The whole thing was actually rather
amateuristic. It was dictated, from cover to cover, on the
weekend: by me. Remarkable arrogance as I look back on it
that I never invited others to contribute. Yet, regular as
clockwork, Reform came out every quarter. This is
the way the great media empires of Randoph Hurst and Rupert
Murdoch were born. Who knows what may yet come of Reform
?
By January 1978 3
Reform was printed for the first time on glossy paper.
It maintained the little quotations designed to catch attention
to each item in the publication. Many people told me that
although the articles were boring, at least the quotations
were worth reading. Each quarter I scoured the dictionaries
of quotations and the old bookshops for pithy sayings and
cartoons to illuminate this unashamed effort to promote the
ALRC and its work. To the end of my term with the Commission,
Reform was just a one-man show. Glancing at the old
pages it brings back memories of the work of the Commission
in those days. It is a kind of archival record that would
be dear to the heart of DrStokes
4 .
I was rather sad when, after my departure, Reform
lapsed and then was only intermittently published. I congratulate
the Commission for reviving regular publications of the "new
look" Reform. I congratulate the President,
Alan Rose, for seeing the value of this "bridge"
between law reformers, the legal profession and the community
generally. I applaud the work of the editor, Michelle Weidenhofer.
I pay tribute to the Editorial Advisory Committee, distinguished
lawyers and citizens. I hope that they will ensure that
Reform continues to provoke as well as to
inform .
It is invidious to single out any of the Advisory Committee
members. But may I be allowed on this occasion to make special
mention of the Honourable David Hunt QC, who has just retired
from distinguished service as Chief Judge at Common Law of
the Supreme Court of New South Wales. I know, from sitting
with him in the Court of Criminal Appeal and from reading
many of his judgments, what an outstanding jurist he is. In
1978-9, even before his appointment to the Supreme Court,
as David Hunt QC, he was a consultant in the ALRC project
of reform of defamation and privacy law. I remain hopeful
that many of the proposals in that reportespecially those
envisaging remedies by way of rights of reply and of correction
rather than money verdictsmay yet come to pass. Perhaps the
recent record of very large jury verdicts in defamation cases
may make media interests more receptive to the ALRC proposals
than once they were. However that may be, David Hunt QC's
life has come full circle. In the twenty intervening years,
he has served the law with great distinctionas, I believe,
has the ALRC. I am glad that he is renewing his association
with the Commission.
A RULE OF CAUTION
I am sure that you will understand that, in my position,
it is necessary now to be even more cautious than I always
was in public utterances. A few years ago I joined and subscribed
to the Movement for the Ordination of Women in the Anglican
Church. Lo and behold, a case concerning that issue came to
the Court of Appeal and I had to disqualify myself
5 . The case was decided
by two Catholics and a Jew. When the Gay and Lesbian Law Reform
Association in Tasmania wrote to me, years ago, to say that
they were running out of funds and asked me to contribute
to their coffers, I unhesitatingly did so. As a citizen, I
regarded their struggle to reform the Tasmanian laws on homosexual
offences as one for basic human rights. But then, soon after
my appointment to the High Court, a case (arising out of their
efforts) came before the High Court
6 . I had to disqualify
myself. The moral of this story is to say as little as possible
in public, to join nothing and certainly to give no one any
money.
So you will understand why my remarks today must be somewhat
circumscribed. Wild horses could not drag out of me a comment
on the following provocative items in the current issue of
Reform:
The constitutional validity of the Native Title
Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth) 7
.
The Government's refusal to implement the ALRC report on
reform of the law of standing to sue for public remedies and
therefore the possible need for ongoing court reforms in this
area of procedural law 8
.
Mr Michael Lavarch's interesting article on the Republican
Convention with comments on ministerial codes of conduct
9 .
Dr Cronen's essay on the adversarial system and whether
it should be reformedan issue that may raise constitutional
questions under Chapter III of the Constitution
10 .
The several essays by Alan Rose
11 , Chris Sidoti
12 and Chief Justice
Alastair Nicholson 13
on the ALRC report on children in court, specifically in the
Family Court. The High Court has reserved its judgment in
an important case, argued on one side by another contributor
to this edition, MrWalker SC, concerning the powers of the
Family Court to make orders directed to a State Legal Aid
body, in relation to the separate representation of children
before the Family Court.
All of these are timely and interesting contributions to
public debate. But upon them I must keep my opinions to myself.
I know how bitterly disappointed you would all be to be deprived
of the eventual pleasure of reading my opinions in the
Commonwealth Law Reports or on the Internet.
For a moment, I thought of a harmless theme when I saw the
excellent article by Michael Antrum on children and the legal
process 14
. He tells the story of the shock he experienced when, from
a home that did not indulge in physical violence, he was sent
to a school where he underwent the cane. I thought the ALRC
had recommended during my time that corporal punishment at
schools should be banned 15
. I remember reading at that time that Napoleon had eradicated
it from most of Europe in the 1790s and it was looked upon
as a quaint English custom, only for export to England's colonies.
In my school days, like MrI too was submitted to the cane.
But only once. And then for spoiling my copybook, literally.
At the Summer Hill Opportunity School in Sydney I had spilt
ink on the pages of a departmental exercise book. Even then
an obsessive type, I tore the ruined pages from the green
covered book issued by the NSW Department of Education. Alas,
the headmaster (Mrhad a marvellous sense of avoirdupois. He
immediately detected my sin. There was no due process. No
right of appeal or administrative review intervened. I was
given four of the best for deliberately destroying Crown property.
My life in the law was launched by this injustice. Perhaps
this childhood experience left a deep scar on my psyche. Certainly,
I admit to a strong devotion to due process, administrative
reform and judicial review. And not only for children.
VALUE JUDGMENTS IN THE LAW
The general theme of this issue of Reform is value
judgments: the ethics of law. On such a theme there is so
much that could be said but I will confine myself to three
points.
First, the debate about the adversary system and its suggested
weaknesses has been stirred up lately by MrWhitton's book
The Cartel. Mr Whitton is a very distinguished and
experienced journalist. He has seen more of the inside of
courtrooms than some barristers. It is important for those
inside the system to listen to the criticisms of those who
view it from outside. In a sense, this is the "bridge"
that Reform also endeavours to offer. But a useful
companion to Mrbook is The Justice Game recently
published by Geoffrey Robertson QC. I feel bound to mention
this, not only because the author sent me a copy. But because
it was Geoffrey Robertson who, in 1974, urged me to accept
appointment to the ALRC when I was actually quite reluctant.
Geoffrey Robertson finishes his book on his many litigious
triumphs with this statement:
"It struck me that we would do better to recognise
that justice is the most serious and important game of all,
and the best side will have a better chance of winning if
its rules are precise and fair and obeyed. For what matters
above all is that the result must never be a foregone conclusion.
For all the grandiose descriptions that have been offered
about the adversary system of trial, and for all the pomp
and self-esteem that tends to affect its professional participants,
it is the best method we have yet devised to give the suckers
an even break".
Though somewhat inelegantly expressed, for a silver-tongued
silk, this summation has substance in the context of the many
cases of stupid, autocratic and frankly oppressive criminal
prosecutions described in Robertson's book. Critics of the
adversary system suggest that it frustrates the discovery
of the truth. Sometimes, it is true, that may occur. But it
is important to remind Australians that the criminal trial,
at least, has purposes in addition to the discovery of what
happened at the scene of the crime. The fundamental purpose
is rather to discover whether the State, with all of its resources
and power, can prove that the person accused is guilty. This
obligation, which must often be extremely frustrating to the
State, lies at the heart of our liberties. It puts a check
on the intrusion of the State in our lives. It defines the
kind of free society we are. It distinguishes our country
from others which strike a different balance between the individual
and the State. It is one of the reasons why Australian freedoms
are stronger than in many of the countries where the search
for the truth becomes all consuming. If you are in doubt,
read Geoffrey Robertson's account of the trial of Mary
WhitehouseGay News 16
, the prosecution of the play The Romans in Britain
17
and the old-style trials in Prague before the Berlin
Wall came down 18
. One of the values of our law is to maintain the high level
of personal freedom which Australians enjoy as against the
encroachments of official authority. If this sometimes means
that the truth is not established in our courts, it may be
because we accept that there are other important social values
which the law must defend. As in so many matters of law reform,
a knowledge of our history is essential to those who would
change things. Not a few of our ancestors in Australia survived
the hangman's noose, and came instead to this country as convicts,
because, flying in the face of the evidence, juries refused
to convict for capital offences. They tempered truth with
the wisdom of justice.
Secondly, the ethics of law surely include honesty on the
part of its decision-makers. I know that there are many who
would like to believe that legal decision-making is simple.
That the sparse language of the Constitution can have only
one meaning. That an Act of Parliament is always unarguably
clear. That an old common law precedent applies exactly to
every new fact situationeven in the age of the Internet, the
genome and rapid global change. Those who sit in judgment
in Australia know that the law is rarely so simple. Yet if
they have a choice and must select one of two or more competing
legal solutions, it is surely more ethical that they should
honestly acknowledge this. And that they expose to the criticism
of their fellow citizens the value judgments which influence
the choice which they select.
Back in my law reform days, in my Boyer Lectures on
The Judges, I urged this candour and honesty upon the
Australian judiciary 19
. After a decade in the ALRC, I could no longer believe the
mythology that an Australian judge flew on automatic pilot
and that all decisions were inevitable and preordained. Unfortunately,
I feel that most citizens of our country still think that
that is what the law is, or should be. Their view is reflected
by not a few politicians and some media commentators. It now
has very few adherents in the legal profession itself. They
know that oftennot alwayschoices have to be made. We have
not yet adapted fully our legal process, court procedures
and techniques of advocacy to this new realism. Doing so is
a major challenge for the ALRC, the courts and the legal profession
of Australia. But that we are in a better shape to confront
the ethical challenge of candour is a significant contribution
which the ALRC for 23 years has made to our legal culture.
In debating matters of legal policy with honesty, empirical
data and an acknowledgment of the complexity of legal choices,
the ALRC has lifted the Australian legal profession's appreciation
of the value judgments which, every day, we have to make.
By hiding them, we may avoid some criticisms. We may convince
some and pretend to ourselves that there is rock-like certainty
in our law. But we will actually debase the ethics of law.
Without honesty, ethics will be replaced by cynicism, self-deception
and mythology.
My third comment is a personal one. In a few weeks a most
distinguished Australian lawyer and past member of the ALRC,
Sir Gerard Brennan, will stand down as Chief Justice of Australia.
Glancing through the early pages of Reform I was
reminded of his magnificent contribution in the early days
of the ALRC and in the Administrative Review Council, to law
reform in this country. I have recently paid tribute to his
energetic support for the use of information technology in
the High Court. This is, I suppose, the most obvious technological
change which distinguishes our early time in law reform and
the Commission of todaywith its Website and constant focus
on technological themes. For an ethical life in the law and
in law reform it would be difficult to find a finer exemplar
than Chief Justice Brennan. Not by accident is he shown in
his portrait at the High Court with volume 175 of the
Commonwealth Law Reports. That volume contains the
Mabo decision 20
which he wrote in 1992.
Today, a life in the law is a life living with reform. That
is why Reform, the journal, is vital reading for
the modern lawyer. I have much pleasure in launching Issue
No 72. It has come a long way since the one-man show of 1976.
And its best years lie ahead.
| 1 |
Justice of the High
Court of Australia. Sometime Chairman of the Australian
Law Reform Commission.
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| 2 |
[1976] Reform, 2 .
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| 3 |
[1978] Reform, 77.
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| 4 |
(1998) 72 Reform, 64.
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| 5 |
ScandrettDowling (1992) 27 NSWLR 483.
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| 6 |
Croome v Tasmania (1997) 71 ALJR 430; 142
ALR 397.
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| 7 |
(1988) 72 Reform, 3.
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| 8 |
Ibid, at 4.
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| 9 |
Ibid, at 27.
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| 10 |
Ibid, at 34.
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| 11 |
Ibid, at 44.
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| 12 |
Ibid, at 48.
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| 13 |
Ibid, at 55.
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| 14 |
Ibid, at 59.
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| 15 |
Australian Law Reform Commission, Child Welfare,
308-310 (pars
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| 16 |
G Robertson, The Justice Game, Chattow and
Windus, London (1998) 138.
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| 17 |
Ibid, at 165.
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| 18 |
Ibid, at 223.
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| 19 |
M D Kirby, The Judges, ABC Boyer Lectures
1983, 33-43.
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| 20 |
Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1.
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