Speeches

• To explore whether, given that on any view some malpractice actions are justifiable, it is the margin of unjustifiable legal actions which is having deleterious consequences or simply general professional malaise for which legal proceedings are a popular scapegoat;

• To examine whether (as is sometimes claimed) medical defence organisations and insurers reflect the culture of the profession they indemnify and seek to vindicate the medical practitioner rather than to settle a case economically before costs have been run up and anger raised on both sides[10];  and

• To examine the practices of plaintiffs' attorneys to decide where the line may be drawn between drumming up wholly meritless cases or promoting objectionable forms of litigious blackmail (on the one hand) and legitimate help and support for comparatively powerless patients (on the other) so that, where justified, such patients can seek to vindicate their rights and recover damages for compensation and solatium.

            Understanding the changing law:  Finding the facts of this kind, elusive as that would be, addresses but one consideration that explains the growth of medical malpractice litigation.  It is equally important to consider trends in the decisions of the highest courts.  Such decisions fix the standards.  Such standards are observed and applied by courts of trial and of appeal.  But they reach further into the decisions made in offices when clients ask an attorney whether they have a case.  They influence the lawyers' assessments of whether to bring or defend a case.  They also affect insurance evaluation, and the decisions of medical defendants on whether they will settle the case or fight it to the end.

            Every country has its own nuances of law in this area.  Different countries have different modes of trial.  In most parts of Australia, jury trial of civil claims has been abolished or is in decline; although occasionally a case returns to emphasise the large scope left to the jury where that mode of trial is still had[11].

            Recent legal developments:  Four related developments have occurred in Australian law which find parallels in other countries[12] and which expand the modern risks of medical malpractice suits:

• In one case the so-called Bolam privilege[13] was rejected  as part of the law.  By the Bolam test, the standard to be applied in malpractice cases is that of the "ordinary skilled man (sic) exercising and professing to have [the relevant] skill".  It was not the test of "the highest expert skill" but only that of "an ordinary competent man".  In Australia, and several other countries, the law has moved away from this surrender of a judgment about what was required to the medical "peers" of the practitioner concerned.  It has substituted the assessment of the reasonable person who will take into account (but not necessarily be governed by) professional standards[14].

• Connected with this line of authority is a growing insistence on the importance of securing true consent from the patient for any intrusive medical procedures.  Such principles, influenced by judicial decisions in Canada and the United States[15], demand that even remote risks, if they might have affected the patient's decision, must be brought to the patient's attention for decision.  The failure to do so will sometimes contribute to the imposition of liability, although the measure of fault is small indeed[16].

• A further area of liability has concerned the extension of legal duties beyond the immediate patient to others, such as an unborn child of a patient, perhaps conceived in an unwanted pregnancy[17].  A still more recent case saw the imposition of a duty of care on a medical practitioner to the de facto husband of the patient.  She attributed her HIV positive status to sexual contact with her partner which, she said, would not have occurred unprotected had she been warned of his HIV status[18].

• In another case, in somewhat special circumstances and having regard to a local statutory provision, a duty was imposed on a medical practitioner to respond to a call to an emergency which, had he done so, might have prevented profound injuries to a young patient living nearby who was in the throes of an epileptic seizure[19].

            These cases, and others outside the field of medical negligence[20], demonstrate the continuing rise of the imperial tort of negligence.  It has expanded beyond all recognition from the days of Donoghue v Stephenson[21].  It is worth reflecting on the reasons for this expansion.

CAUSES OF CHANGE

          The phenomenon of insurance:  There could be no denying the influence which systems of statutory insurance in the fields of employer liability and motor car negligence have had on the expansion of the tort of negligence.  The provision of schemes of compulsory insurance in those fields contributed significantly to the growth of a specialised section of the legal profession with particular expertise and much enthusiasm for pushing forward negligence liability generally.  It should be no cause for surprise that this push came to be felt in the field of medical negligence.  There, practical considerations rather than statutory obligations, meant that a profession able to do so would ordinarily be insured, as would the institutions in which, and with which, that profession worked[22].

          The demand for accountability:  Beyond this there is the consideration of public education and community attitudes.  No only are medical practitioners under scrutiny and subject to criticism much more than they were in times gone by.  The same attitude reaches into every section of society.  It affects the judiciary, the churches, the political leadership and even the Royal Family.  No one is now immune.  Everyone is accountable.  This tide is unlikely to turn.  Consciousness of rights is much more clearly established.  It is now served by a legal profession most of whose members share the attitude that wrong-doers should be rendered answerable in the courts which belong to all people and not just to the wealthy.

          Evidence of error and malpractice:  In the particular field of healthcare, there are many contemporary studies which demonstrate that error is relatively common.  Redress is comparatively rare, occasionally necessary and sometimes fully justifiable.

          There is growing evidence that mistakes having serious consequences do occur in medical practice.  Because of the nature of healthcare, mistakes often have extremely serious results for the patient and the patient's family.  The Head of the Clinical Risk Unit at University College London, Dr Charles Vincent, was reported recently as estimating, on the basis of an empirical survey, that up to 40,000 patients a year in Britain die as a result of medical error.  This is about four times more than die from all other types of non-deliberate civil wrongs.  The report also studied non-fatal errors in drug prescription and infections which are said to affect 280,000 people in the United Kingdom each year with an annual additional cost of remedial care of £730 million in England alone. 

          Dr Vincent's results were not dissimilar to those produced a few weeks earlier, published by the Kellogg Foundation concerning experience in the United States[23].  That report concluded that 70% of the errors (and 155,000 deaths) in that country resulting from medical misfeasance, were avoidable[24].  Even if one were to discount these cases significantly for patients and their families who were philosophical about their fate, it cannot be denied that in many such cases legal proceedings for negligence and breach of contract would be completely justifiable.  Such proceedings would sanction the losses of particular patients.  They might also instil a greater measure of responsibility and reinforce professional efforts to ensure accountability.

          In addition to these studies, there are countless reports supporting the need for particular care to avoid misdiagnosis.  Some such studies are published by medical experts[25].  Others are written by patients who took the precaution of securing a second medical opinion[26].  Because of numerous headlines calling medical error to public notice[27], governments and their advisers are now much more aware than they were in earlier times of the fallibility of medical diagnosis and treatment and the justification of facilitating legal redress in at least serious cases.  Even Eleanor Roosevelt, we now read, may have been a victim of misdiagnosis and mistreatment in her last days[28].  If it could happen to her, it could happen to anyone.  A democratic society is not likely to tolerate a legal system which denies a remedy, at least in serious cases.  Such denial would be viewed as sanctioning an unjustifiiiable assignment of the economic burden of medical error, a failure to afford effective legal stimulus to the careless individual and to provide systemic remedies necessary to prevent such errors from recurring.

REMEDIAL ACTION

          What can be done to respond effectively to the complaints about the current law of civil remedies in a way that attempts to meet the concerns of the reasonable critics whilst affording relief to those who suffer because of serious avoidable mistakes in the provision of proper healthcare? 

• Accident Compensation:          The most radical solution is to abolish tort recovery by statute and to replace it by a comprehensive system of exclusive monetary compensation for all "personal injuries by accident".  This is the measure that was adopted by the Parliament of New Zealand following the Woodhouse Report[29].  It built upon earlier schemes for workers' compensation benefits dependent upon compulsory insurance paid by employers.  In some jurisdictions, such schemes have abolished tort claims for work injuries, making statutory compensation the exclusive remedy against an employer for all industrial accidents[30].  In various countries this model, in turn, gave rise to the abolition or modification of tort claims for motor vehicle accidents.  It substituted no fault benefits for the victims of such accidents based on statutory provisions allowing for weekly payments and lump sum entitlements[31].  In New Zealand, in 1974, Parliament went a step further.  It swept aside tort remedies in all personal accident cases.  It seems that a decision was originally taken that medical misadventure should be excluded from the Act[32].  However, some cases of medical error are now covered.  To overcome the criticism that inclusion of such cases removed deterrence to healthcare providers, provision was later made for no claim bonuses and specific contributions from them to the fund in accordance with experience rating[33].

The great inducement of the New Zealand scheme was that it cut down the extremely expensive costs of delivering the compensation dollar by way of tort litigation.  However, accident compensation of this kind has many critics.  Fiscal constraints have limited the growth of benefits in New Zealand in proportion cost of living changes.  Borderline cases of entitlement have proved troublesome.  Some critics have taken a more fundamental objection.  "Privileged treatment for victims of accidents is difficult to justify in general grounds, and can be explained only as a pragmatic substitution for the former tort liability"[34].  Why, for example, should there be public compensation for victims of accidents but not to those disabled by disease or illness?  A scheme similar to the Woodhouse law was proposed for Australia in 1974[35].  However, it was not enacted.  Although it still has supporters within Australia, the prospects for such fundamental and national reform now seem "dim"[36].  Since 1974, a further complication has intervened in Australia.  At least in the case of persons who enjoy a common law right to compensation, it is now questionable whether the Federal Parliament could abolish such a right without affording those affected "just terms" as promised by the constitutional provision limiting acquisition of property under federal law[37].

•  No fault legislation:          Because similar political and constitutional problems would have to be faced in many democratic countries, it seems unlikely, at least in the short term, that comprehensive national compensation will replace the tort system.  Specific no fault schemes will continue to be enacted by legislatures around the world.  But, as in the past, it is probable that these will be confined to employment and industrial injury cases[38].  Yet there is no reason in principle why a specific statutory scheme could not be adopted in respect of medical negligence[39].  Nevertheless, to deprive an individual of established civil rights would have to run the gauntlet of constitutional provisions and human rights requirements.  At least in Europe, the latter are having an ever-increasing impact in this area of discourse[40].  The moves in New Zealand, designed to ensure that healthcare providers contribute specially to the accident compensation fund, suggests that, in democracies, the lawmakers would be resistant to providing special immunities.  Only the strongest possible arguments based on an intolerable blowout in litigation, a crushing burden of premiums that could not be deflected, established proof of undesirable consequences in medical practice, and unacceptable distortions to the healthcare system generally[41] would seem likely to produce such a result.  Yet democracy is a strange system of government.  It can sometimes respond to loud voices and powerful lobbies.  But in this area the relevant lobbies will generally tend to cancel each other out.

• Capping damages:          The introduction by legislation of semi-arbitrary limits, or "caps", on the recovery of damages in particular cases has been a feature of lawmaking in many countries.  In Australia and elsewhere statutory "caps" on the recovery of non-financial heads of damage have been introduced in legislation covering motor car injuries, employment accidents and dust diseases claims[42].  Such caps can occasionally be quite severe.  Effectively, they shift a proportion, or the whole, of former legal entitlements to compensation to the person claiming to be the victim of a legal wrong.  In some jurisdictions of the United States (eg California) the capping of damages and the introduction of periodic payments over a given threshold, together with restrictions on contingency fees, have had a significant effect on medical malpractice suits.  Thus, the premium for liability insurance for obstetricians in California is now said to be $US40,000 whereas in Florida, a State where no such reforms have been enacted, the premiums are said to be $US152,000 a year[43].  Such legislation, particularly if introduced to protect a special category of defendants, would in many jurisdictions have to run the gauntlet of constitutional requirements and human rights scrutiny.

• Governmental subventions:          Sometimes remedies to particular problems concerning malpractice suits can be afforded without actual change in tort law.  Thus, in New South Wales, Australia, in 1998 the specific concerns affecting obstetricians and gynaecologists in the Sydney area, said to be facing threats to the viability of their practices by reason of litigation risk and premium increase, resulted in governmental intervention.  The State Treasury Managed Fund reportedly agreed to offer cover for services for public patients.  These constituted more than 90% of the patients at risk[44].  Legal liability law remained the same.  But some of the risk was shifted to government rather than to prospective patients and their families.

• Risk management:          Another remedy is the introduction of closer attention to risk management both by healthcare professionals and their insurers.  A systemic problem of tort law recovery is that, in practice, court decisions and settlements often resolve individual cases without necessarily having much of an impact on matters of practice and on preventing recurrences of error.  Drawing inferences from particular cases for risk management is an important obligation of modern professional people, their insurers and professional organisations.  A report in Annals of Internal Medicine in December 1999[45] concerned a study of malpractice cases.  The authors asked the question:  why patients sue?  The reason discerned was that "patients often form unrealistic expectations because their physicians fail to discuss treatment alternatives"[46].  The authors of the study recommended immediate disclosure of errors to patients and their families and thorough discussion with them about the results and the steps being taken to prevent recurrence of error.  Whilst lawyers and insurers might have hesitations about this advice, the authors of the study at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine suggested that such candour, and if appropriate an apology, diminishes the risk of litigation.

• Case management:          In addition to the foregoing initiatives, it is essential for courts to streamline their processes in medical malpractice cases.  Doing so will help promote mediation and court referred alternative dispute resolution where this is appropriate[47].  In one jurisdiction of Australia, a special list and specialised judges deal with such cases efficiently.  They can group proceedings involving common parties.  They can facilitate the reception of reliable expert evidence and more easily differentiate reliable testimony from unreliable[48].  One innovation of importance to hard pressed medical witnesses has been the growing use of telephone and video conference facilities in respect of certain testimony[49]

  THE FUTURE

            The defects of the present way by which most countries of the common law deliver redress to the victims of medical misadventure are well established[50].  Equally plain are the defects of the alternative systems on offer.  Suggestions that particular professional groups should enjoy immunity from suit for their errors adversely affecting other citizens would appear to fall on increasingly deaf ears.  At least this seems so as far as the courts are concerned.  To the contrary, the trend of recent authority in the United Kingdom[51], Australia[52], the United States[53] and elsewhere has been to extend liability and to reduce immunities, even where these were formerly provided by the law.  Advocates, and in parts of the United States, even judges are now being held professionally liable for errors revealing incompetence.  So the trend of the common law seems to be running against immunity.

            If such protection is to be provided, it will therefore probably have to come from the legislature.  Courts can reconsider the scope of negligence liability.  They can improve their procedures.  They can offer determinative dispute resolution.  But it seems unlikely that they will enlarge the immunities. 

            If the introduction of national compensation schemes, to abolish tort liability altogether, now appears unlikely, other statutory relief is available and has been tried.  But to make out a good claim for it, strong empirical justification is necessary.  Angry words will ordinarily not be enough.  Generalities will usually leave the lawmakers, and the community, unmoved.

            The dialogue on this issue between lawyers and healthcare providers, between plaintiffs and defendants, between Law Societies and Medical Colleges and between politicians and citizens will continue.  But the foundation for successful future strategies lies in a lesson which reformers can learn from the techniques of medical research rather than from the law's technique of rhetoric.  It lies not in expostulation but in painstaking empirical studies and statistical data.  Unless the latter bear out a compelling case for change, it seems likely that, in most parts of the world, negligence will continue its imperial expansion.  As with other imperial forces in the past, there will be beneficiaries.  And there will be victims.