



HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
PERTH REGISTRY

BETWEEN:

OLEG VLADIMIROVICH DERIPASKA
Appellant

and

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Respondent

**SUBMISSIONS OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR
THE STATE OF VICTORIA (INTERVENING)**

PARTS I, II & III: CERTIFICATION AND INTERVENTION

1. These submissions are in a form suitable for publication on the internet.
2. The Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (**Victoria**) intervenes pursuant to s 78A of the *Judiciary Act 1903* (Cth).

PART IV: ARGUMENT

3. Victoria makes two submissions in support of the respondent.
4. **First**, Victoria submits that the authorities identify three well-established limits on when a court may read down or “partially disapply”¹ a statutory provision pursuant to s 15A of the *Acts Interpretation Act 1901* (Cth). Those limits ensure that the reading down exercise occurs within the proper confines of an exercise of judicial power. However, they do not prevent a court from reading down or partially disapplying a general provision that, on its terms, operates in an area that is subject to a constitutional limitation, even though the limitation is not otherwise derived from the text or subject matter of the statutory provision in

¹ *Clubb v Edwards* (2019) 267 CLR 171 at [422]-[424] and [431]-[433] (Edelman J). In these submissions, we refer to reading down as encompassing partial disapplication, notwithstanding that there may be a question as to whether they are conceptually distinct.

issue (compare Appellant’s Submissions (**AS**) at [26]-[31]). These submissions are developed in **Section A**.

5. Victoria adopts the Joint Submissions of the Respondent and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (**CS**) as to why the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia did not err in its application of s 15A of the *Acts Interpretation Act*² to the question of whether regs 14 and 15 of the *Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011* (Cth) (**Regulations**) could be read down in the present case.³

6. **Secondly**, Victoria submits that it is inappropriate and unnecessary for the Court to decide the issues that the appellant raises at **AS [42]-[52]** in respect of Ch III and s 75(iii) of the *Commonwealth Constitution* for the reasons outlined in **Section B**.

A. Principles relating to the application of s 15A of the *Acts Interpretation Act*

7. Section 15A of the *Acts Interpretation Act* provides a statutory mandate to courts to read down a provision, where it is reasonably open to do so, to give it effect to the greatest extent that is constitutionally permissible.⁴ The section plainly cannot, and does not purport to, give a court power to “rewrite” a statute that it is tasked with interpreting.⁵ It would be impermissible for the legislature to delegate to the Court “the legislative task of making a new law from the constitutionally unobjectionable parts of the old”.⁶
8. The authorities establish three clear limits on the application of s 15A, and cognate provisions such as s 6(1) of the *Interpretation of Legislation Act*

² As applied to subordinate legislation by s 13(1)(a) of the *Legislation Act 2003* (Cth).

³ The Regulations were made under s 10 the *Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011* (Cth).

⁴ See *Tajjour v New South Wales* (2014) 254 CLR 508 at [171] (Gageler J); *Residual Assco Group Ltd v Spalvins* (2000) 202 CLR 629 at [28] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan JJ); *Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd* (1971) 124 CLR 468 at 493 (Barwick CJ); *Australian Railways Union v Victorian Railways Commissioners* (1930) 44 CLR 319 at 373-374 (Isaacs CJ).

⁵ *Re F; Ex parte F* (1986) 161 CLR 376 at 385 (Gibbs CJ), cited in *Victoria v Commonwealth* (1996) 187 CLR 416 (**Industrial Relations Act Case**) at 502, fn 276 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

⁶ *Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth* (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 372 (Dixon J).

1984 (Vic), which ensure that courts apply such provisions “strictly within the limits of judicial power”.⁷

9. **First**, s 15A cannot apply to a law if it appears that “the law was intended to operate fully and completely according to its terms, or not at all”.⁸ By s 15A, Parliament has reversed the presumption which exists at common law that a statute is to “operate as a whole”⁹ and “indicated its general intention that all Federal laws shall to be held valid so far as possible”.¹⁰ However, the application of s 15A is subject to a contrary intention arising from the statute being interpreted,¹¹ and it therefore does not apply where there can be discerned a legislative intention that the law is to operate either fully or not at all. This limit ensures that the reading down exercise does not result in a construction that is inconsistent with a clear expression of Parliament’s intention in enacting the law being construed.
10. **Secondly**, s 15A cannot apply to alter the policy or operation of the provision being construed in its application to those cases which, after reading down, remain within its terms.¹² This limit may be conceived of as having two dimensions.
 - (1) The first is that the reading down exercise cannot effect “a partial validation of a provision which extends beyond power” unless “the operation of the remaining parts of the law remains unchanged”.¹³ The “reduced form” of the law that results from the reading down must “operate upon the persons and things affected by it in the same manner as the enacted words would

⁷ *Spence v Queensland* (2019) 268 CLR 355 at [87] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ). These submissions refer to three limits on the operation of s 15A, the first being where a law is intended to operate fully or not at all. However, it is also possible to conceive of the second and third limits discussed below as being ways of identifying *when* that first limit will be engaged.

⁸ *Industrial Relations Act Case* (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 502 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ), quoting *Pidoto v Victoria* (1943) 68 CLR 87 at 108 (Latham CJ). See also *Tajjour* (2014) 254 CLR 508 at [169] (Gageler J).

⁹ *Bank of New South Wales* (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 371 (Dixon J).

¹⁰ *Pidoto* (1943) 68 CLR 87 at 107 (Latham CJ).

¹¹ *Acts Interpretation Act*, s 2(2).

¹² *Pidoto* (1943) 68 CLR 87 at 111 (Latham CJ); see also *Clubb* (2019) 267 CLR 171 at [431]-[432] (Edelman J).

¹³ *Industrial Relations Act Case* (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 502 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ), quoting *Pidoto* (1943) 68 CLR 87 at 108 (Latham CJ).

have operated upon those persons and things had Parliament had the legislative power to have validly passed the enactment”.¹⁴

- (2) The second, related, dimension is that the reading down exercise must result in a “consistent workable and effective body of provisions”.¹⁵ For this reason, s 15A does not permit the reading down of a provision to operate in a more confined field where that field is “incapable of specification with any certainty”.¹⁶ Nor, it is submitted, does it permit the reading down of a provision to so confine its operation as to effectively hollow out the law to the extent that it becomes alien to, or practically incapable of achieving, Parliament’s purpose in enacting it.

11. **Thirdly**, there is an additional difficulty in applying s 15A where the law in question “can be reduced to validity by adopting any one or more of a number of several possible limitations”.¹⁷ In such a case, if “no reason based upon the law itself can be stated for selecting one limitation rather than another, the law should be held to be invalid”.¹⁸ The *Acts Interpretation Act* “does not authorize the Court, by adopting a standard criterion or test merely selected by itself, to redraft a statute or regulation so as to bring it within power and so preserve its validity”.¹⁹ The purpose of this third limitation, as with the first two, is to ensure that a court does not stray beyond the proper confines of judicial power into legislative territory — in this case, by ensuring that the court cannot simply choose for itself the limitation by reference to which a provision is read down.
12. However, where a general provision purports to operate in part in an area that is subject to a clear constitutional limitation, and a court reads the provision down in a manner consistent with that limitation, it cannot be said that the court has

¹⁴ *Strickland* (1971) 124 CLR 468 at 493 (Barwick CJ).

¹⁵ *Strickland* (1971) 124 CLR 468 at 493 (Barwick CJ).

¹⁶ *YBFZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs* (2024) 419 ALR 457 at [75] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Gleeson and Jagot JJ).

¹⁷ *Industrial Relations Act Case* (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 502 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ), quoting *Pidoto* (1943) 68 CLR 87 at 111 (Latham CJ).

¹⁸ *Industrial Relations Act Case* (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 502 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ), quoting *Pidoto* (1943) 68 CLR 87 at 111 (Latham CJ).

¹⁹ *Pidoto* (1943) 68 CLR 87 at 111 (Latham CJ).

chosen for itself “one limitation rather than another” from “a number of several possible limitations” (cf AS [28]). In such a case, it is the *Constitution* which provides the limitation (CS [27]). It is an orthodox exercise of judicial power for a court to interpret a law subject to the *Constitution* so as to give the law its maximum constitutionally permissible operation, and that is what s 15A in plain terms directs a court to do (unless, of course, one of the other limits on the application of s 15A apply). The manner in which the court may *express* the constitutional limitation in its application to the relevant law is just as much a matter of judgment and judicial technique as any exercise in statutory construction. The authorities outlined by at CS [28]-[33] make clear that this is a well-established application of s 15A of the *Acts Interpretation Act*.

13. This is a permissible application of s 15A of the *Acts Interpretation Act* even if the relevant constitutional limit is “incapable of precise definition”,²⁰ and “even if an inquiry of fact is required to determine whether the constitutional limitation would or would not be engaged in so far as the law would apply to particular persons in particular circumstances”.²¹ In both situations, the court is exercising judicial power in an orthodox manner by interpreting a statute subject to the requirements of the *Constitution*. There is no reason why s 15A should not apply in these circumstances. Its application reflects the fact that the ultimate task of a court engaged in a reading down exercise is to give effect to Parliament’s

²⁰ *Tajjour* (2014) 254 CLR 508 at [171] (Gageler J), referring to the *Industrial Relations Act Case* (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 503 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ) (concerning the reading down of a provision that would otherwise infringe the *Melbourne Corporation* doctrine) and *Clarke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation* (2009) 240 CLR 272 at [66] (Gummow, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (observing that the inquiry required by the *Melbourne Corporation* doctrine turns upon matters of degree and evaluation and “constitutional facts”), 317-318 (recording the orders of the Court). As the *Industrial Relations Act Case* (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 503 demonstrates, the fact that the application of a constitutional limit may turn upon matters of degree and evaluation does not necessarily mean that the field remaining after the reading down of a provision by reference to that constitutional limit will be incapable of being specified with certainty: see CS [29], [51].

²¹ *Tajjour* (2014) 254 CLR 508 at [171] (Gageler J), referring to *Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales* (1990) 170 CLR 276 at 291-292 (the Court) and *Re Nolan; Ex parte Young* (1991) 172 CLR 460 at 487-488 (Brennan and Toohey JJ). This passage from his Honour’s judgment was cited with approval in *Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection* (2017) 263 CLR 1 at [66], fn 109 (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

intention as manifested in both the text of the impugned provision *and* the text of s 15A.

14. In light of these principles, Victoria adopts **CS [34]-[56]** as to why the Full Court did not err in its application of s 15A to the present case. Adopting the approach of the courts below — of addressing the composite hypothetical question of the validity of the Regulations as if they were primary legislation — reading down regs 14 and 15 to be subject to the constitutional limitation derived from s 75(v), in the manner accepted by the Full Court, is well within the operation of s 15A. The nature and scope of the limitation derived from s 75(v) is clear, and its application to the Regulations has been expressed in a manner that gives it practical content, in that it turns on an objective assessment of the purpose of the relevant actions, which is readily made.²² The residual operation of the Regulations after the reading down exercise remains entirely unchanged — a person remains prohibited from dealing with designated persons or entities, or controlled assets, in all circumstances to which the Regulations apply and the range of such circumstances remains significant. In light of these considerations, there is no indication in the Regulations that they were intended to fail in their entirety if they cannot validly operate to the fullest extent that their general terms would otherwise cover, and in circumstances which may never arise.
15. For completeness, Victoria submits that there may be some constraint, deriving from the first two limits described above, on the ability of a court to read down statutory provisions so as to be subject to a constitutional limitation on legislative power, although this constraint has no application to the present case.

²² See *Deripaska v Minister for Foreign Affairs* [2025] FCAFC 36 (FC) at [84] (**CAB 95-96**). See also *Tajjour* (2014) 254 CLR 508 at [171] (Gageler J). And compare *Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission* (2002) 213 CLR 543. In *Daniels*, a generally expressed statutory power to compel the production of documents was construed as being subject to legal professional privilege, such that the power was read so as not to extend to require the production of privileged documents; the assessment of whether that privilege attaches to a document (and thus whether the power extends to compel production of that document), turns — similarly to the present case — on an assessment of the purpose of conduct in the context of the provision of legal advice or litigation.

As outlined above, particularly in relation to the second limitation, where reading down a provision would result in an unworkable or ineffective body of provisions, it may be that the remaining law would be so altered from that enacted by Parliament that reading down the law in that way would amount to the court writing a new law, which would be impermissible.

16. Such a reading down may be unworkable if, for example, it required persons tasked with applying and enforcing the relevant law to make a considered assessment, in the midst of a dynamic situation (such as some public protests), as to whether the limitation has been breached (that is, for example, as to whether the application of the law to particular conduct is an unjustified burden on political communication).²³ Alternatively, such a reading down may result in an ineffective body of provisions if it hollowed out the scope of their application to such an extent that they would have no, or virtually no, operation. The inability to read down a provision for these reasons may indicate that in some cases it is not possible to preserve its partial operation, but it may instead reinforce the validity of the provision in so far as it may demonstrate that there is no less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the law.
17. However, for the reasons given in paragraph 14 above, these potential qualifications have no application in the present case.

B. It is inappropriate and unnecessary for the Court to decide the issues at AS [42]-[52]

18. The two alternative bases on which the appellant argues that regs 14 and 15 are invalid at AS [42]-[52] do not arise in this case.

²³ See, eg, *Clubb* (2019) 267 CLR 171 at [235] (Nettle J). Compare *Clubb* (2019) 267 CLR 171 at [436] (Edelman J); and *Farm Transparency International Ltd v New South Wales* (2022) 277 CLR 537 at [191] (Gordon J). Reading down or partially disapplying a law by excluding from its ambit all communication on governmental or political matters, without the need to make a judgment in real time about whether the application of the provision to particular conduct would infringe the implied freedom, is somewhat different: see *Farm Transparency* (2022) 277 CLR 537 at [101]-[102] (Gageler J). For example, a reading down of this nature was suggested in *Farm Transparency* (2022) 277 CLR 537 at [217] (Edelman J) and *Coleman v Power* (2004) 220 CLR 1 at [110] (McHugh J), but resisted in *Attorney-General (SA) v Adelaide City Corporation* (2013) 249 CLR 1 at [218] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ).

The appellant's argument with respect to legal representation and Ch III

19. The question whether Ch III of the *Constitution* imposes some limit on the Commonwealth Parliament's ability to legislate in a manner that limits a person's access to legal representation in a Ch III court, and the scope of any such limitation, is not an issue that properly arises for decision in this case. This is so for three reasons:

- (1) **First**, the effect of the Full Court's conclusions is that regs 14 and 15 do not apply to any action of the appellant or his legal representatives taken for the objective purpose of bringing the present proceeding, this being a proceeding commenced under the original jurisdiction conferred on the Federal Court by s 39B(1) of the *Judiciary Act*.²⁴ There is no reason to consider the validity of regulations that, by reason of that reading down, have no application to this proceeding.
- (2) **Secondly**, the appellant (rightly) does not contend that regs 14 and 15 have impacted his ability to bring this proceeding. Rather, the appellant contends that the issue may arise in a future hypothetical proceeding he may wish to bring (**AS [43]**). There exists no state of facts which makes it necessary to answer this question to do justice between the parties, and it would therefore be inappropriate for the Court to do so, in light of its settled approach to resolving questions of constitutional invalidity.²⁵
- (3) **Thirdly**, and in any event, at all material times the appellant (and other persons and entities designated under the Regulations) have had the benefit of permits issued by the Minister under reg 18 that have mitigated the effect of regs 14 and 15 insofar as those regulations would have otherwise limited their access to legal representation.²⁶ Unless the Minister were to revoke that permit, no person or entity designated under

²⁴ FC at [84] (**CAB 95-96**).

²⁵ *Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Western Australia* (2021) 274 CLR 219 at [56]-[57] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ); see also *Unions NSW v New South Wales* (2023) 277 CLR 627 at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Gleeson and Jagot JJ).

²⁶ FC at [29], [31] (**CAB 82**).

the Regulations will be limited by the Regulations in their ability to be legally represented in a Ch III court or to seek legal advice in relation to bringing legal proceedings generally against the Commonwealth or a person on behalf of the Commonwealth. The question raised by the appellant about the extent to which Ch III limits Parliament's power to pass laws that limit access to legal representation in a Ch III court does not arise in this case, and may never arise.

20. There is a further, related, reason why this case is an inappropriate vehicle for this Court to consider the existence and scope of any limit imposed by Ch III on the Commonwealth Parliament's power to pass laws that limit access to legal representation in a Ch III court.
21. Chapter III limits the Commonwealth Parliament's power to pass laws which require a Ch III court to exercise its power in a manner that is inconsistent with the essential requirements of a court or with the nature of judicial power.²⁷ A law that requires a court to act in a manner that is procedurally unfair may breach this limit,²⁸ although whether a law does so will depend upon the terms of the particular law and its practical operation in the circumstances of a particular case.²⁹
22. That is, it would be necessary to demonstrate that a law that limits the ability of a party who has the desire and the means to be legally represented to access that representation would, in the *particular* circumstances, have such a significant impact on proceedings in a Ch III court as to impair the institutional integrity of the court. Whether that is so would depend upon whether the effect of the law in question, in its application to the facts of the individual case, is to require the

²⁷ *Polyukhovich v Commonwealth* (1991) 172 CLR 501 at 607 (Deane J), 689 (Toohey J), 703-704 (Gaudron J); *Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs* (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).

²⁸ See *Leeth v Commonwealth* (1992) 174 CLR 455 at 470 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ); *Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd* (2013) 252 CLR 38 at [67]-[68] (French CJ), [177], [194] (Gageler J).

²⁹ See, eg, the various conclusions reached in *SDCV v Director-General of Security* (2022) 277 CLR 241, as discussed in *MJZP v Director-General of Security* [2025] HCA 26 at [7]-[11] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beach-Jones JJ). See also *Condon* (2013) 252 CLR 38 at [68] (French CJ), [157] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), [188] (Gageler J).

court to proceed in a manner that is procedurally unfair. A law that places some restrictions on the availability of legal representation in certain civil proceedings will not necessarily result in the requisite unfairness. A law that prevents access to any legal representation at all may have a greater tendency to do so, but it would depend on the whole of the law in question, the availability and adequacy of the court's other powers (such as to appoint a contradictor or an *amicus curiae*) and the circumstances of the particular case. As outlined above, there are no facts presently before this Court to suggest that any person's access to any court has been limited by the Regulations.

23. This observation serves simply to highlight that, in the absence of a factual scenario in which a person has been prevented from obtaining representation, it would be inappropriate for the Court to consider the scope of any such limit imposed by Ch III on the Commonwealth Parliament's ability to legislate with the effect of limiting access to legal representation in Ch III courts.

The appellant's argument with respect to s 75(iii)

24. Similarly, the question of whether this Court's jurisdiction under s 75(iii) of the *Constitution* would be limited by regs 14 and 15, and (if so) the extent to which that jurisdiction is entrenched, does not arise in this case, for three reasons:
 - (1) **First**, as outlined in paragraph 19(1) above, the effect of the Full Court's conclusions with respect to s 75(v) (and its statutory analogue in s 39B(1) of the *Judiciary Act*) is that regs 14 and 15 do not apply to any action of the appellant or his legal representatives taken for the purpose, in an objective sense, of bringing the present case.³⁰ It follows that no question of the validity of the Regulations properly arises before this Court, including with respect to s 75(iii).
 - (2) **Secondly**, as the Full Court held, the present proceedings were not brought under this Court's original jurisdiction under s 75(iii); rather the proceedings fell within s 39B(1) of the *Judiciary Act*, which is equivalent

³⁰ FC at [84] (CAB 95-96).

to s 75(v).³¹ And the *Judiciary Act* does not contain a provision that confers jurisdiction upon the Federal Court in terms identical to s 75(iii). In addition, the fact that the appellant sought a declaration in the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court that regs 14 and 15 are invalid (in addition to seeking an order in the nature of an injunction), and that the Federal Court's order dismissing that application was the subject of an appeal to the Full Court, and, in turn, the Full Court's order was then the subject of the present appeal in this Court, does not mean that the appellant has invoked *this* Court's original jurisdiction under s 75(iii); rather this Court's jurisdiction in this appeal arises under s 73(ii) of the *Constitution* (cf **AS [51]-[52]**). Accordingly, this case is not an appropriate vehicle to test whether this Court's jurisdiction under s 75(iii) would be limited by regs 14 and 15, and (if so) the extent to which such jurisdiction is entrenched.

- (3) **Thirdly**, and in any event, for the reasons outlined at paragraph 19(3) above, the existence of the Ministerial permits at all relevant times means that neither the appellant nor any other designated person or entity is unable to seek legal representation to invoke this Court's jurisdiction under s 75(iii). The issue sought to be agitated by the appellant does not arise in this proceeding, and may never arise at all.

25. It is no answer to the proposition that the question concerning s 75(iii) does not properly arise, to say, as the appellant does, that the Full Court failed to consider whether the Regulations *could* be read down to the extent that they *would* impermissibly encroach upon the entrenched jurisdiction of this Court under s 75(iii) (cf **AS [51]**). The Full Court did not need to consider that question because its conclusion on reading down the Regulations to account for the entrenched jurisdiction under s 75(v) meant that the Regulations did not apply *at all* to the conduct of the appellant, or his legal representative, taken for the objective purpose of bringing this proceeding. For the same reason, nor does this Court need to consider the question whether the Regulations could be read down to the extent that they would infringe s 75(iii).

³¹ FC at [97] (**CAB 98**).

26. However, if this Court does consider it appropriate to consider whether the Regulations could be read down to account for any entrenched jurisdiction of this Court under s 75(iii), then Victoria adopts the Commonwealth's submissions at **CS [62]**. Victoria would add the further observation that s 78 of the *Constitution* gives the Parliament power to "make laws conferring rights to proceed against the Commonwealth or a State in respect of matters within the limits of the judicial power". This alone provides a basis to doubt the conferral of any entrenched right to proceed against the Commonwealth under s 75(iii).

PART V: ESTIMATE OF TIME

27. Victoria estimates that approximately 15 minutes will be required for the presentation of oral submissions.

Dated: 16 October 2025



ALISTAIR POUND
Solicitor-General for Victoria
 (03) 9225 8249
 alistair.pound@vicbar.com.au

MADELEINE SALINGER
Owen Dixon Chambers West
 (03) 9225 8444
 madeleine.salinger@vicbar.com.au

ANNEXURE TO VICTORIA'S SUBMISSIONS

No	Description	Version	Provision(s)	Reason for providing this version	Applicable date(s)
1.	<i>Commonwealth Constitution</i>	Compilation No 6 (29 July 1977 to present)	Ch III (generally); ss 73(ii), 75(iii), 75(v)	Currently in force	N/A
2.	<i>Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)</i>	Compilation No 38 (11 December 2024 to present)	s 15A	Currently in force, governs interpretation of legislation	N/A
3.	<i>Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (Cth)</i>	Compilation No 14	Regs 14, 15, 18	In force on date of decision to “designate” and “declare” the appellant	17 March 2022
4.	<i>Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic)</i>	Authorised Version No 131 (6 September 2023 to present)	s 6(1)	Currently in force, illustrative	N/A
5.	<i>Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)</i>	Compilation No 39 (24 February 2019 to present)	s 13(1)(a)	Currently in force	N/A
6.	<i>Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)</i>	Compilation No 49 (18 February 2022 to 11 June 2024)	s 39B	Governs the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court when proceeding WAD 15 of 2023 was commenced	19 January 2023